New app-level `copy` / `copy all` / `copy last` command (ADR-0041). Delivery is OSC 52 *and* a best-effort native write (arboard), always both — OSC 52 acceptance is undetectable, so a true fallback can't be built. Payload is the panel's plain text exactly as rendered (tags, ✓/✗, box-drawing), drift-locked to render_output_line. arboard added --no-default-features (X11-only; OSC 52 covers Wayland). Amends ADR-0003's command registry; requirements V6.
9.0 KiB
ADR-0041: Copy the output panel to the system clipboard
Status
Accepted — 2026-06-02 (issue #11). Amends ADR-0003's app-command
registry (adds copy). First feature to add a native clipboard
dependency (arboard); builds on the ADR-0040 echo/marker and
ADR-0037-Am1 tag model for the "what is on screen" definition.
Context
Filing a bug report today means terminal-selecting the relevant region of the output panel, fighting the panel border and line wrapping, and pasting the result — often with stray box characters or truncated lines. A built-in copy removes that friction and tightens the bug-report → reproduction loop, which is the stated motivation of issue #11.
The output panel is a rolling VecDeque<OutputLine> (OUTPUT_CAPACITY
= 1000). Each OutputLine carries the raw text plus a kind, a
mode_at_submission, optional styled_runs, and an echo status; the
visible text — the [simple]/[system]/[error] tag, the
running: prefix vs. the trailing ✓/✗ marker (ADR-0040), the
de-emphasised Executing SQL: teaching prefix (ADR-0038) — is composed
at render time in render_output_line, not stored in text.
Four design axes were open (the issue enumerated them). Each was escalated to the user; the answers below are the user's.
Decision
1. Command surface — copy / copy all / copy last
A new app-level command (works in both modes, sigil-free per ADR-0009), added to the ADR-0003 registry:
| Form | Copies |
|---|---|
copy |
the entire output panel (bare form = all) |
copy all |
the entire output panel (explicit) |
copy last |
the most recent command's output unit |
copy last is defined as from the most recent OutputKind::Echo
line to the end of the buffer — i.e. that command's echo, its result
body (table / plan / counts), and any teaching-echo / cascade notes.
If the buffer has no echo line, there is nothing to copy.
Boundary note (accepted). App-level commands (mode, messages,
copy itself) push [system] lines with no echo, so they have no
clean "last command" boundary: after one, copy last reaches back to
the previous DSL command's echo and bundles the intervening
app-command notes (including a prior copy's own confirmation line, if
present). This is inherent to echo-less app commands and is accepted —
copy last targets the last executed DSL/data/SQL command, which is
the bug-report case; copy all is the catch-all.
No keybinding (user's choice — typed command only). An unknown
sub-word (copy foo) funnels to a friendly copy.unknown error,
mirroring mode/messages.
2. Mechanism — OSC 52 and native (arboard), always both
A copy always does two things, in order:
- Emit an OSC 52 escape (
ESC ] 52 ; c ; <base64> BEL) to the terminal. Needs no new dependency —base64andcrosstermare already present. Works over SSH (the local terminal owns the clipboard). Inside tmux the sequence is wrapped in tmux's DCS passthrough (ESC P tmux; … ESC \, every innerESCdoubled), detected via$TMUX. - Attempt a native write via
arboard. Reaches the local desktop clipboard reliably; a failure (e.g. a headless SSH host with no display) is silently ignored — OSC 52 has already carried the payload.
Why both, unconditionally. OSC 52 acceptance is undetectable — the terminal sends no acknowledgement, so a true "fall back when OSC 52 is unsupported" cannot be built. Doing both means at least one path delivers in every environment: local desktop (native, plus a redundant identical OSC 52 write — harmless), SSH (OSC 52), SSH-in-tmux (wrapped OSC 52). The two writes carry identical content, so there is no conflict.
3. Format — plain text, verbatim as shown
The clipboard receives the rendered logical line for each
OutputLine — tag included ([simple] create table T ✓,
[system] Customers, [error] …), the ✓/✗ marker, the
Executing SQL: prefix, and box-drawing tables — joined by \n. No
colour (clipboards are plain text), no Markdown conversion, no tag
stripping. "As shown" means the renderer's per-line content, without
the viewport's right-edge space-padding or soft-wrapping: the copied
text is the full logical line (so it reflows cleanly in the paste
target and carries no trailing whitespace), not the literal terminal
cells. So a pasted bug report reproduces the user's screen and tells
the maintainer which lines were echoes, system notes, or errors, and
what each command's outcome was. Fidelity is enforced by a drift-lock
test against render_output_line (see Implementation notes).
A short [system] confirmation line is appended after the copy
(copy.done, "Copied N line(s) to the clipboard."); an empty target
yields copy.nothing and no clipboard write.
4. arboard features — --no-default-features (X11 on Linux)
arboard is added with default features off (drops the heavy
image crate; we only handle text). On Linux this is X11-only —
the wayland-data-control feature was deliberately not enabled
because it nearly doubles the dependency tree (~30 crates:
wl-clipboard-rs, wayland-*, quick-xml, nom, petgraph), and
OSC 52 already covers native-Wayland sessions (and most Wayland
desktops run XWayland, so x11rb works regardless). Minimising
dependency surface is the secure-by-default posture (CLAUDE.md
security policy). Revisit only if a concrete native-Wayland-without-OSC-52
need appears.
Security
New dependency, so the Security-Reviewer lens applies (CLAUDE.md):
- Maintainer/licence:
arboard3.6.1, maintained by 1Password,MIT OR Apache-2.0(matches the project), MSRV 1.71 — the de-facto standard Rust clipboard crate. - Scans (against the
--no-default-featureslockfile):cargo audit(41 crates) → 0 vulnerabilities;osv-scanner→ no issues. Re-run before signoff. - Feature posture: write-only. We never read the clipboard, so the OSC 52 read exfiltration vector is not in play; OSC 52/native write of the user's own visible output is benign.
- No secrets exposure: the playground holds learning data, not credentials; copied content is whatever the user already sees.
Limitations (accepted, documented)
- OSC 52 payload size: some terminals cap the escape length (older
xterm defaults are small). A very large
copy allmay be truncated on the OSC 52 path in such terminals; the native path delivers the full text locally. The 1000-line buffer cap bounds the worst case. - OSC 52 terminal support varies and cannot be confirmed (no
read-back). tmux needs
set-clipboard on;screenpassthrough is a different format and is not wrapped (documented gap). - Native over SSH writes the remote machine's clipboard (useless to the user) — which is exactly why OSC 52 runs too and the native error is ignored.
Implementation notes
Action::CopyToClipboard(String)—update()stays pure: it builds the full text fromApp.outputand returns the action; the runtime performs the I/O. The confirmation[system]line is pushed after the text is captured, so it is never part of the copy.OutputLine::plain_text()— a theme-free helper reproducing the on-screen content (line content is theme-independent; only colour is not). A drift-lock test asserts it equals the concatenation ofrender_output_line(line, &theme)span contents for every line shape (pending/ok/err echo, system, error, teaching echo, styled plan, data-table row), so the copy can never silently diverge from the renderer.clipboardmodule —osc52_sequence(text, tmux) -> Stringandemit_osc52(&mut impl Write, …)are pure/injectable (unit-tested against aVec<u8>, no terminal needed). A long-livedarboard::Clipboardis held by the runtime and created lazily on first copy (so OSC-52-only users never pay the X11 connect), then reused — required because arboard's X11 backend serves the selection from a background thread owned by theClipboard; dropping it after eachset_textwould lose the contents.
Out of scope
- Markdown / styled export (the issue's option) — plain-text was chosen; Markdown table/plan conversion is a separate effort.
- Selection / range copy and a keybinding — typed command only.
- OSC 52 read / paste-in — write-only; reading is the security vector and is unneeded.
screenpassthrough wrapping — tmux only.
See also
- ADR-0003 — the app-command registry
copyjoins. - ADR-0040 / ADR-0037 Amendment 1 — the echo
✓/✗marker and the tag model that define "what is on screen". - ADR-0038 — the teaching-echo line shape reproduced verbatim.
- ADR-0007 —
export(the other "get data out" path; complementary). - Issue #11 — the report and the four escalated design axes.