Harden temp-project cleanup with stacked safety guards

The previous remove_dir_all on a path returned by Project::path()
was too trusting: an unusual CLI argument or a hand-edited
project.yaml could in principle have steered cleanup into
deleting the wrong directory. Replace it with
safely_delete_temp_project, which refuses unless every one of
the following passes:

1. Path is not a symlink (checked before canonicalize so a
   symlink can't smuggle a different target through).
2. Path is a directory.
3. Canonical path is under <active-data-root>/projects/
   (canonical-prefix containment).
4. Directory basename contains the literal `[temp]` marker.
5. Direct children are exclusively well-known project
   artefacts (project.yaml, data/, history.log,
   playground.db, .gitignore, lock file) plus migration .bak
   files and atomic-write .tmp files. Any stranger file
   (notes.md, .git/, screenshots, etc.) makes the helper
   refuse.

is_unmodified_temp now also requires data/ to be empty, in
addition to project.yaml's tables and relationships being
empty. A hand-edited yaml that drops the schema list but
leaves CSVs in data/ no longer passes.

Failure to delete is non-fatal -- the helper returns
SafeDeleteError, the runtime logs a tracing::warn!, and the
project stays on disk. Leaving an unexpected directory alone
is always preferable to a wrong delete.

Tests: 345 passing (272 lib + 9 + 5 + 6 + 27 + 9 + 17),
0 failing, 0 skipped. 7 new tests covering each guard,
including a unix-only symlink-rejection test.
This commit is contained in:
claude@clouddev1
2026-05-08 06:59:26 +00:00
parent b7addd6161
commit 58a964da8c
3 changed files with 315 additions and 34 deletions
+110 -1
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@ use rdbms_playground::event::AppEvent;
use rdbms_playground::db::Database;
use rdbms_playground::dsl::{ColumnSpec, Type};
use rdbms_playground::persistence::Persistence;
use rdbms_playground::project::{self, Project, ProjectKind, copy_project};
use rdbms_playground::project::{
self, Project, ProjectKind, copy_project, safely_delete_temp_project,
};
const fn key(code: KeyCode) -> AppEvent {
AppEvent::Key(KeyEvent {
@@ -387,6 +389,113 @@ fn named_project_is_never_unmodified_temp() {
assert!(!opened.is_unmodified_temp());
}
#[test]
fn safely_delete_removes_genuine_unmodified_temp() {
let data = tempdir();
let project = project::open_or_create(None, Some(data.path())).unwrap();
let path = project.path().to_path_buf();
drop(project); // release lock so we can delete
assert!(path.exists());
safely_delete_temp_project(&path, data.path()).expect("should delete");
assert!(!path.exists());
}
#[test]
fn safely_delete_refuses_path_outside_data_root() {
let data = tempdir();
let other = tempdir();
// Construct a directory outside the data root that LOOKS
// like a temp project (has [temp] marker + project.yaml).
let foreign = other.path().join("20260507-[temp]-fake-fake-fake");
fs::create_dir_all(&foreign).unwrap();
fs::write(
foreign.join("project.yaml"),
"version: 1\nproject:\n created_at: x\ntables: []\nrelationships: []\n",
)
.unwrap();
let err = safely_delete_temp_project(&foreign, data.path()).expect_err("must refuse");
assert!(format!("{err}").contains("not inside"), "got: {err}");
assert!(foreign.exists(), "foreign dir must still exist");
}
#[test]
fn safely_delete_refuses_directory_without_temp_marker() {
let data = tempdir();
// Create a project directory under the data root that
// doesn't carry the [temp] marker.
let projects_dir = data.path().join(project::PROJECTS_SUBDIR);
fs::create_dir_all(&projects_dir).unwrap();
let named = projects_dir.join("MyOrders");
fs::create_dir(&named).unwrap();
fs::write(named.join("project.yaml"), "version: 1\n").unwrap();
let err = safely_delete_temp_project(&named, data.path()).expect_err("must refuse");
assert!(format!("{err}").contains("[temp]"), "got: {err}");
assert!(named.exists());
}
#[test]
fn safely_delete_refuses_directory_with_unexpected_file() {
let data = tempdir();
let project = project::open_or_create(None, Some(data.path())).unwrap();
let path = project.path().to_path_buf();
// Drop a stranger file into the project dir.
fs::write(path.join("notes.md"), "user notes\n").unwrap();
drop(project);
let err = safely_delete_temp_project(&path, data.path()).expect_err("must refuse");
assert!(format!("{err}").contains("unexpected file"), "got: {err}");
assert!(path.exists());
assert!(path.join("notes.md").exists());
}
#[test]
fn safely_delete_allows_migration_backups_and_tmp_files() {
let data = tempdir();
let project = project::open_or_create(None, Some(data.path())).unwrap();
let path = project.path().to_path_buf();
fs::write(path.join("project.yaml.v1.bak"), "old\n").unwrap();
fs::write(path.join("project.yaml.tmp"), "stage\n").unwrap();
drop(project);
safely_delete_temp_project(&path, data.path()).expect("should delete");
assert!(!path.exists());
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn safely_delete_refuses_symlink_top_level() {
use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
let data = tempdir();
let real_target = tempdir();
let projects_dir = data.path().join(project::PROJECTS_SUBDIR);
fs::create_dir_all(&projects_dir).unwrap();
let link = projects_dir.join("20260507-[temp]-aaa-bbb-ccc");
symlink(real_target.path(), &link).unwrap();
let err = safely_delete_temp_project(&link, data.path()).expect_err("must refuse");
assert!(format!("{err}").contains("symbolic link"), "got: {err}");
// Real target untouched.
assert!(real_target.path().exists());
// Symlink itself untouched.
assert!(link.exists());
}
#[test]
fn unmodified_temp_with_residual_csv_in_data_dir_is_not_unmodified() {
let data = tempdir();
let project = project::open_or_create(None, Some(data.path())).unwrap();
// Hand-drop a CSV into the data dir without going through
// the persistence layer. Schema in yaml is still empty.
let csv = project.path().join("data").join("Stranger.csv");
fs::write(&csv, "id\n1\n").unwrap();
assert!(
!project.is_unmodified_temp(),
"non-empty data dir must disqualify the unmodified-temp check",
);
}
#[test]
fn list_projects_sorts_by_mtime() {
let data = tempdir();